Because the district court did not commit clear error in
finding Clarin’s design to be functional, it is unnecessary
to decide whether Clarin committed fraud on the
Patent and Trademark Office. All a finding of fraud does
is knock out the mark’s “incontestable” status, and its
registration, under §1115(b)(1). It does not affect the
mark’s validity, because a trademark need not be registered
to be enforceable. See Orient Express Trading Co. v.
Federated Department Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 653–54
(2d Cir. 1988) (a trademark can be enforced under 15
U.S.C. §1125(a) even after its federal registration is
cancelled for fraud); Far Out Productions, Inc. v. Oskar, 247
F.3d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 2001) (a trademark can be enforced
under state common law even after its federal registration
is cancelled for fraud); see also J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §31:60
(2006 ed.). A finding of fraud therefore would not end
the case; a finding of functionality does.
Clarin contends that we should consider this topic
even though it does not affect Specialized’s right to sell a
copycat chair, because it might matter to attorneys’ fees,
but fees have not been awarded. A decision on legal
issues just because they might matter to some later
dispute would be advisory. Clarin also appears to be
concerned that the district judge’s finding of fraud might
affect future litigation against a different competitor, but issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) applies only to
issues actually and necessarily resolved in the first case.
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979); Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §27 (issue preclusion operates only
if the earlier resolution was “essential to the judgment”).
It was not necessary to address fraud on the PTO, so the
district judge’s opinion on this subject does not have
preclusive effect.
AFFIRMED
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