In this trademark “dilution by tarnishment” case, brought
under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, the question is whether the plaintiff,
an international lingerie company that uses the trade name designation “Victoria’s
Secret” has a valid suit for injunctive relief against the use of the name “Victor’s Little
Secret” or “Victor’s Secret” by the defendants, a small retail store in a mall in
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, that sells assorted merchandise, including “sex toys” and other
sexually oriented products. The District Court issued the injunction. Since then the shop
has been operating under the name of “Cathy’s Little Secret.” The District Court
concluded that even though the two parties do not compete in the same market, the
“Victor’s Little Secret” mark — because it is sex related — disparages and tends to
reduce the positive associations and the “selling power” of the “Victoria’s Secret” mark.
The question is whether the plaintiff’s case meets the definitions and standards for “dilution by tarnishment” set out in the new Act which amended the old Act, i.e., the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.
The new Act was expressly intended to overrule the Supreme Court interpretation
of the old Act in this very same case, Moseley v. V Secret Catalog, Inc., 537 U.S. 418
(2003), rev’g 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), aff’g 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
The Supreme Court reversed a panel of this Court that had affirmed an injunction against
“Victor’s Little Secret” issued by the District Court. On remand to the District Court
from the Supreme Court after the 2003 reversal, no new evidence was introduced, and
the District Court reconsidered the case based on the same evidence but used the new
language in the new Act which overrules the Supreme Court in this case. We will first
brief the Supreme Court opinion and the reasons Congress overruled the Supreme Court
in this case. We will then outline our understanding of the new standards for measuring
trademark “dilution by tarnishment” and apply them to this case. We conclude that the
new Act creates a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that
a new mark used to sell sex related products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there
is a clear semantic association between the two. That presumption has not been rebutted
in this case.
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