VeriSign v.

Plaintiff Verisign, Inc. is in the business of selling internet domain names and operates the popular .com and .net top-level domains. In 2014, a competitor arrived on the scene: Defendant XYZ.COM, LLC (“XYZ”) launched “.xyz,” a new top-level domain, and began registering domain names ending in .xyz. As part of its marketing push, XYZ, along with its CEO Daniel Negari, made a series of statements touting the popularity of the .xyz domain and warning of a scarcity of desirable .com domain names. Verisign sued XYZ and Negari, alleging that those statements violated the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions.

The district court granted summary judgment to XYZ, holding that Verisign could not establish the elements of a Lanham Act claim. We agree. As to XYZ’s self-promoting statements, most of which concern its registration numbers, we hold that Verisign failed to produce the required evidence that it suffered an actual injury as a direct result of XYZ’s conduct. Nor can Verisign establish, we hold, that XYZ’s statements about the availability of suitable .com domain names were false or misleading statements of fact, as required for Lanham Act liability. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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Petronas v.

Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in an action under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, the panel held that the ACPA does not provide a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting.

Petroliam Nasional Berhad, a Malaysian oil and gas company that owned the trademark to the name “PETRONAS,” alleged that, Inc., a domain name registrar, engaged in contributory cybersquatting when a registrant used GoDaddy’s domain name forwarding service to direct the domain names “” and” to an adult web site hosted on a web server maintained by a third party.

The panel held that neither the plain text nor the purpose of the ACPA provided support for a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting. It held that the ACPA created a new and distinct cause of action, and Congress did not incorporate the common law of trademark, including contributory infringement, into the ACPA. The panel therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.

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Even if a domain name was put up innocently and used properly for years, a person is liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) if he subsequently uses the domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from the protected mark by holding the domain name for ransom. The evidence sufficiently supported the jury’s verdict that Nahum did so, causing $152,000 in damages to DSPT.



Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc.

David Lahoti appeals the district court’s bench trial judgment that his use of the “VeriCheck” Georgia state service mark owned by Vericheck, Inc. violated the Anti- Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86, and various Washington common law doctrines. Lahoti, who has previously been found liable for cybersquatting activities, obtained the domain name “vericheck. com,” but did not use the website to offer any goods or services. We conclude that the district court’s factual decision that the “VeriCheck” mark was a distinctive, legally protectable mark under the ACPA and federal trademark law was based in part on reasoning contrary to federal trademark law and based in part on reasoning that could support the district court’s conclusion. Because we believe the district court should decide the issue of distinctiveness in light of the principles we explain, we vacate the district court’s opinion and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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Southern Grouts & Mortars v. 3M Company

Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. sells swimming pool finishes under the trademark DIAMOND BRITE and would like to register and use the domain name,, to advertise and sell its products. The problem for Southern Grouts is that its competitor in the swimming pool finishing industry, 3M Company, owns the registration. When 3M obtained the registration for, it also had trademark rights in the DIAMOND BRITE mark but not for use with pool finishing products. Instead, the mark was registered for use in connection with “electronically controlled display panels and signs.” Those trademark rights have lapsed, but 3M has continued to re-register the domain name. 3M displays no content on the website and has no intention of doing so. Southern Grouts sued 3M in district court, alleging that 3M’s continued registration of the domain name violated the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and constituted unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 3M. Southern Grouts appeals that judgment as well as the district court’s denial of its motion to amend its second amended complaint.

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Audi AG v. D'Amato

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant Bob D’Amato, who is unaffiliated with Audi, used the domain name to sell goods and merchandise displaying Audi’s name and trademarks. Audi claims that D’Amato’s website infringes and dilutes its world famous trademarks “AUDI,” the “AUDI FOUR RING LOGO,” and “QUATTRO,” as well as the distinctive trade dress of Audi automobiles. Audi also claims that D’Amato violated the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. The district court granted summary judgment and injunctive relief to Audi on all claims. The district court also granted Audi attorneys’ fees, but refused to award Audi statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). D’Amato appeals the grant of summary judgment and injunctive relief and award of attorneys’ fees to Audi. He also appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 56(f) motion for additional discovery. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM the district court.

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