BWP Media USA, Inc. v. T & S Software Associates, Inc.

This appeal is about whether “volitional conduct” is required to establish a claim for direct copyright infringement. Defendant T&S Software Associates, an internet service provider, hosted an internet forum on which third-party users posted images that infringed copyrights owned by plaintiffs BWP Media USA and National Photo Group. The plaintiffs sued T&S for direct and secondary copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of T&S. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s direct infringement holding. We AFFIRM.

Download BWP Media USA Inc. v. T & S Software Associates Inc.

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller LLC

Reversing the district court’s partial summary judgment in favor of defendants, the panel held that a service that captures copyrighted works broadcast over the air, and then retransmits them to paying subscribers over the Internet without the consent of the copyright holders, is not a “cable system” eligible for a compulsory license under the Copyright Act.

Under § 111 of the Act, a “cable system” is eligible for a so-called compulsory license that allows it to retransmit “a performance or display of a work” that had originally been broadcast by someone else—even if such material is copyrighted— without having to secure the consent of the copyright holder. So long as the cable system pays a statutory fee to the Copyright Office and complies with other regulations, it is protected from infringement liability.

The panel concluded that § 111 was ambiguous on the question presented. Deferring to the Copyright Office’s interpretation, the panel held that Internet-based retransmission services are not eligible for the compulsory license that § 111 makes available to “cable systems.”

Download Fox Television Stations Inc. v. Aereokiller LLC

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands

A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated. That test is satisfied here. Pp. 3–17.

(a) Separability analysis is necessary in this case. Respondents claim that two-dimensional surface decorations are always separable, even without resorting to a §101 analysis, because they are “on a useful article” rather than “designs of a useful article.” But this argument is inconsistent with §101’s text. ”[P]ictorial” and “graphic” denote two-dimensional features such as pictures, paintings, or drawings. Thus, by providing protection for “pictorial, graphical, and sculptural works” incorporated into the “design of a useful article,” §101 necessarily contemplates that such a design can include two dimensional features. This Court will not adjudicate in the first instance the Government’s distinct argument against applying separability analysis, which was neither raised below nor advanced here by any party. Pp. 4–6.

(b) Whether a feature incorporated into a useful article “can be identified separately from,” and is “capable of existing independently of,” the article’s “utilitarian aspects” is a matter of “statutory interpretation.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 214. Pp. 6–10.

(1) Section 101’s separate-identification requirement is met if the decision maker is able to look at the useful article and spot some two or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. To satisfy the independent-existence requirement, the feature must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once it is imagined apart from the useful article. If the feature could not exist as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own, it is simply one of the article’s utilitarian aspects. And to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own, the feature cannot be a useful article or “[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful article,” §101. Neither could one claim a copyright in a useful article by creating a replica of it in another medium. Pp. 7–8.

(2) The statute as a whole confirms this interpretation. Section 101, which protects art first fixed in the medium of a useful article, is essentially the mirror image of §113(a), which protects art first fixed in a medium other than a useful article and subsequently applied to a useful article. Together, these provisions make clear that copyright protection extends to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works regardless of whether they were created as freestanding art or as features of useful articles. P. 8.

(3) This interpretation is also consistent with the Copyright Act’s history. In Mazer, a case decided under the 1909 Copyright Act, the Court held that respondents owned a copyright in a statuette created for use as a lamp base. In so holding, the Court approved a Copyright Office regulation extending protection to works of art that might also serve a useful purpose and held that it was irrelevant to the copyright inquiry whether the statuette was initially created as a freestanding sculpture or as a lamp base. Soon after, the Copyright Office enacted a regulation implementing Mazer’s holding that anticipated the language of §101, thereby introducing the modern separability test to copyright law. Congress essentially lifted the language from those post-Mazer regulations and placed it in §101 of the 1976 Act. Pp. 8–10.

(c) Applying the proper test here, the surface decorations on the cheerleading uniforms are separable and therefore eligible for copyright protection. First, the decorations can be identified as features having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. Second, if those decorations were separated from the uniforms and applied in another medium, they would qualify as two-dimensional works of art under §101. Imaginatively removing the decorations from the uniforms and applying them in another medium also would not replicate the uniform itself.

The dissent argues that the decorations are ineligible for copyright protection because, when imaginatively extracted, they form a picture of a cheerleading uniform. Petitioner similarly claims that the decorations cannot be copyrighted because, even when extracted from the useful article, they retain the outline of a cheerleading uniform. But this is not a bar to copyright. Just as two-dimensional fine art correlates to the shape of the canvas on which it is painted, two dimensional applied art correlates to the contours of the article on which it is applied. The only feature of respondents’ cheerleading uniform eligible for a copyright is the two-dimensional applied art on the surface of the uniforms. Respondents may prohibit the reproduction only of the surface designs on a uniform or in any other medium of expression. Respondents have no right to prevent anyone from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform that is identical in shape, cut, or dimensions to the uniforms at issue here. Pp. 10–12.

(d) None of the objections raised by petitioner or the Government is meritorious. Pp. 12–17.

(1) Petitioner and the Government focus on the relative utility of the plain white uniform that would remain if the designs were physically removed from the uniform. But the separability inquiry focuses on the extracted feature and not on any aspects of the useful article remaining after the imaginary extraction. The statute does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning useful article at all. Nor can an artistic feature that would be eligible for copyright protection on its own lose that protection simply because it was first created as a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful. This has been the rule since Mazer, and it is consistent with the statute’s explicit protection of “applied art.” In rejecting petitioner’s view, the Court necessarily abandons the distinction between “physical” and “conceptual” separability adopted by some courts and commentators. Pp. 12–15.

(2) Petitioner also suggests incorporating two “objective” components into the test—one requiring consideration of evidence of the creator’s design methods, purposes, and reasons, and one looking to the feature’s marketability. The Court declines to incorporate these components because neither is grounded in the statute’s text. Pp. 15–16.

(3) Finally, petitioner claims that protecting surface decorations is inconsistent with Congress’ intent to entirely exclude industrial design from copyright. But Congress has given limited copyright protection to certain features of industrial design. Approaching the statute with presumptive hostility toward protection for industrial design would undermine that choice. In any event, the test adopted here does not render the underlying uniform eligible for copyright protection. Pp. 16–17.

799 F. 3d 468, affirmed.

Download Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Geophysical Service v. TGS-Nopec Geophysical

Canada has a law that requires companies who gather seismic data about the Earth’s substructure to submit their findings to the Canadian government. After a period of confidentiality, the Canadian agency that compiles this data is then apparently permitted to release it to members of the public upon specific request. In this case, a Houston company requested seismic data from this Canadian agency pursuant to that law, and the Canadian agency sent copies of a particular Canadian company’s seismic data to the United States. The Canadian company then sued the Houston company, alleging copyright infringement.

We are called upon to determine whether the act of state doctrine forbids a United States court from considering the applicability of copyright’s first sale doctrine to foreign-made copies when the foreign copier was a government agency. We hold that it does not. We must also decide whether the inapplicability of the Copyright Act to extraterritorial conduct bars a contributory infringement claim based on the domestic authorization of entirely extraterritorial conduct. We hold that it does. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Download Geophysical Service v. TGS-Nopec Geophysical

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Flo & Eddie v. Sirius XM Radio

Defendant-Appellant Sirius XM Radio, Inc., appeals from the November 14, 2014 and December 12, 2014 orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.) denying its motions, respectively, for summary judgment and for reconsideration in connection with Plaintiff-Appellee Flo & Eddie, Inc.’s copyright infringement suit. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13-cv-5784 (CM), 2014 WL 7178134 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2014) (denial of motion for reconsideration); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denial of motion for summary judgment). We previously concluded that the appeal raised a significant and unresolved issue of New York law that is determinative of this appeal: Is there a right of public performance for creators of pre-1972 sound recordings under New York law and, if so, what is the nature and scope of that right?

We certified this question to the New York Court of Appeals. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2016). The Court of Appeals accepted certification and responded that New York common law does not recognize a right of public performance for creators of pre-1972 sound recordings. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2016 WL 7349183 (N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016).

In light of this ruling, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and REMAND with instructions to grant Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and to dismiss the case with prejudice.

Download Flo & Eddie v. Sirius XM Radio

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enterprise

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an action under the Copyright Act.

Design Data Corporation alleged that Unigate Enterprise, Inc., infringed the copyright on Design Data’s computer aided design program by downloading an unauthorized copy of the program and importing and distributing within the United States program output generated by a Chinese contractor using an unauthorized copy of the program. The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the downloading claim. The panel held that there was a material question of fact whether Unigate’s download was more than an insignificant violation of Design Data’s copyright.#

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the importation-and-distribution claim. The panel held that the copyright in the program did not extend to the program’s output of images and files. The panel also affirmed the district court’s decision to refuse Design Data a further opportunity to amend its complaint.

Download Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enterprise

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants in a copyright case involving the Usenet, an international collection of organizations and individuals whose computers connect to one another and exchange messages posted by Usenet users.

Defendant Giganews, Inc., owns and operates several Usenet servers and provides its subscribers with fee-based access to content stored on its own servers as well as content stored on the servers of other Usenet providers. Defendant Livewire Services, Inc., provides its subscribers with access to the Usenet content stored on Giganews’s servers. Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc., owns the exclusive copyrights to tens of thousands of adult images, many of which have been illegally distributed over Giganews’s servers.######### The panel affirmed the district court’s partial dismissal and partial grant of summary judgment on Perfect 10’s direct copyright infringement claim. The panel held that causation, also referred to as “volitional conduct,” by the defendant is one of the elements of a prima facie case of direct infringement. The panel held that the volitional conduct requirement was not met on Perfect 10’s theories that the defendants directly infringed its display rights and distribution rights. The panel concluded that the evidence showed only that Giganews’s actions were akin to passively storing material at the direction of users in order to make that material available to other users upon request, or automatically copying, storing, and transmitting materials upon instigation by others. The volitional conduct requirement also was not met as to the claim that Giganews directly infringed on Perfect 10’s right to reproduce by uploading infringing content onto the Usenet or Giganews’s servers.

The panel held that Giganews was not liable for contributorycopyright infringement because Perfect 10 failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Giganews materially contributed to or induced infringement of Perfect 10’s copyrights. The panel held that there were no simple measures available that Giganews failed to take to remove Perfect 10’s works from its servers. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on Perfect 10’s vicarious infringement claim. The panel held that Perfect 10 failed to demonstrate a causal link between the infringing activities and a financial benefit to Giganews. The panel affirmed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendants under the Copyright Act and its denial of defendants’ request for supplemental fees. The panel also affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ request to amend the judgment to add a judgment debtor as Perfect 10’s alter ego.

Download Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Ultraflo Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc.

This appeal requires us to again consider the preemptive force of the Copyright Act. Plaintiff Ultraflo Corporation asserts an unfair competition by misappropriation claim under Texas law alleging that a competitor stole its drawings showing how to design valves and then used them to make duplicate valves. We have previously held that copyright preempts this Texas cause of action when the intellectual property at issue is within the subject matter of copyright. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 785–89 (5th Cir. 1999). Ultraflo contends that its claim escapes preemption because its valve design, when separated from the drawing itself, is afforded no protection under the Copyright Act. Because copyright preemption prohibits state interference with Congress’s decision not to grant copyright protection just as much as it protects a decision to provide protection, the district court correctly found that the state claim is preempted.

Download Ultraflo Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc.

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Hart v. Amazon.com, Inc.

Granted, there is counterfeiting of books (especially text‐ books), in which Amazon may be involved to the extent of advertising and selling such books, though without neces‐ sarily knowing they’re counterfeit. See, e.g., Eliza Green, “The Problem of Fake Books on Amazon,” May 9, 2012, http://elizagreenbooks.com/the‐problem‐of‐fake‐books‐on‐ amazon/ (visited Dec. 24, 2016, as was the next website cit‐ ed). But counterfeiting can’t be presumed. For example, “all of the apparent copycat books that Fortune found on Ama‐ zon were made through CreateSpace, which is a division of Amazon.” Mario Aguilar, “Amazon Is Overrun With a Plague of Bestseller Knockoffs,” April 16, 2012, http://gizmodo.com/5902283/amazon‐is‐overrun‐with‐a‐plag ue‐of‐fake‐books. Hart’s obscure self‐published titles are a far cry from the pirated bestsellers regularly found on Ama‐ zon, and his assertion that the Internet giant must have un‐ dertaken the cost of reproducing his hardcover books be‐ cause they were “not sourced” by him and lack his nail in‐ dentations (when neither do his self‐published books, if one may judge from the photos) doesn’t meet even a minimum standard of plausibility. The judgment of the district court dismissing his suit with prejudice is therefore AFFIRMED.

Download Hart v. Amazon.com, Inc.

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.

Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc.

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of Electronic Arts, Inc., in a diversity action seeking unpaid royalties pursuant to a contract, arising from alleged copyright infringement.

Plaintiff Robin Antonick developed the computer code for the original John Madden Football game for the Apple II computer, which was released by Electronic Arts. Electronic Arts subsequently released Madden games for Sega Genesis and Super Nintendo for which plaintiff received no royalties under a 1986 contract.

Concerning plaintiff’s Sega claims, the panel held that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence of copyright infringement because neither the source code used for Apple II Madden nor Sega Madden was in evidence. The panel also rejected plaintiff’s argument that Electronic Arts’s postverdict Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the intrinsic test for copyright infringement should not have been considered.

Concerning plaintiff’s Super Nintendo claims, the panel held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s derivative work claims because the Apple II and Super Nintendo processors were not in the same microprocessor family, as defined by the parties’ contract. The panel also affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the jury could not have determined plaintiff’s damages from the alleged breach of contract to a reasonable certainty. The panel further held that, even if the district court erred, there was no harm, because plaintiff’s failure to introduce any source code precluded a finding that Super Nintendo Madden was a derivative work.

Finally, the panel held that plaintiff offered no evidence of purported damages arising from plaintiff’s claim that Electronic Arts used development aids to create nonderivative works without seeking a negotiated license.

Download Antonick v. Electronic Arts, Inc.

Need help protecting your intellectual property? Visit Gehrke & Associates, SC to learn more about how we can help enhance and defend your intellectual property.  Thank you.