Respondent National Football League (NFL) is an unincorporated
association of 32 separately owned professional football teams, also respondents
here. The teams, each of which owns its own name, colors, logo, trademarks, and
related intellectual property, formed respondent National Football League
Properties (NFLP) to develop, license, and market that property. At first, NFLP
granted nonexclusive licenses to petitioner and other vendors to manufacture and
sell team-labeled apparel. In December 2000, however, the teams authorized NFLP
to grant exclusive licenses. NFLP granted an exclusive license to respondent
Reebok International Ltd. to produce and sell trademarked headwear for all 32
teams. When petitioner’s license was not renewed, it filed this action alleging
that the agreements between respondents violated the Sherman Act, §1 of which
makes “[e]very contract, combination … or, conspiracy, in restraint of trade”
illegal. Respondents answered that they were incapable of conspiring within §1’s
meaning because the NFL and its teams are, in antitrust law jargon, a single
entity with respect to the conduct challenged. The District Court granted
respondents summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: The alleged conduct related to licensing of
intellectual property constitutes concerted action that is not categorically
beyond §1’s coverage. Pp. 4–20.
(a) The meaning of “contract, combination … , or,
conspiracy” in §1 of the Sherman Act is informed by the Act’s “ ‘basic
distinction between concerted and independent action.’ ” Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp. , 467 U. S. 752 . Section 1 “treat[s]
concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior,” id. , at 768,
because, unlike independent action, “[c]oncerted activity inherently is fraught
with anticompetitive risk” insofar as it “deprives the marketplace of
independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands,”
id. , at 768–769. And because concerted action is discrete and distinct,
a limit on such activity leaves untouched a vast amount of business conduct.
That creates less risk of deterring a firm’s necessary conduct and leaves courts
to examine only discrete agreements. An arrangement must therefore embody
concerted action in order to be a “contract, combination … or, conspiracy” under
§1. Pp. 4–6.
(b) In determining whether there is concerted action
under §1, the Court has eschewed formalistic distinctions, such as whether the
alleged conspirators are legally distinct entities, in favor of a functional
consideration of how they actually operate. The Court has repeatedly found
instances in which members of a legally single entity violated §1 when the
entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity. See, e.g., United States
v. Sealy, Inc. , 388 U. S. 350 . Conversely, the Court
has found that although the entities may be “separate” for purposes of
incorporation or formal title, if they are controlled by a single center of
decisionmaking and they control a single aggregation of economic power, an
agreement between them does not constitute a “contract, combination … or,
conspiracy.” Copperweld, 467 U. S., at 769. Pp. 6–10.
(c) The relevant inquiry is therefore one of substance,
not form, which does not turn on whether the alleged parties to contract,
combination, or conspiracy are part of a legally single entity or seem like one
firm or multiple firms in any metaphysical sense. The inquiry is whether the
agreement in question joins together “separate economic actors pursuing separate
economic interests,” Copperweld, 467 U. S., at 768, such that it
“deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,” id.
, at 769, and therefore of diversity of entrepreneurial interests and thus
of actual or potential competition. If it does, then there is concerted action
covered by §1, and the court must decide whether the restraint of trade is
unreasonable and therefore illegal. Pp. 10–11.
(d) The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic power
characteristic of independent action. Each of them is a substantial,
independently owned, independently managed business, whose “general corporate
actions are guided or determined” by “separate corporate consciousnesses,” and
whose “objectives are” not “common.” Copperweld , 467 U. S., at 771. They
compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans,
for gate receipts, and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel. See,
e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. , 518 U. S. 231 . Directly
relevant here, the teams are potentially competing suppliers in the market for
intellectual property. When teams license such property, they are not pursuing
the “common interests of the whole” league, but, instead, the interests of each
“corporation itself.” Copperweld , 467 U. S., at 770. It is not
dispositive, as respondents argue, that, by forming NFLP, they have formed a
single entity, akin to a merger, and market their NFL brands through a single
outlet. Although the NFL respondents may be similar in some sense to a
single enterprise, they are not similar in the relevant functional sense. While
teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still
separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team
trademarks are not necessarily aligned. Nor does it matter that the teams may
find the alleged cooperation necessary to compete against other forms of
entertainment. Although decisions made by NFLP are not as easily classified as
concerted activity, the NFLP’s decisions about licensing the teams’ separately
owned intellectual property are concerted activity and thus covered by §1 for
the same reason that decisions made directly by the 32 teams are covered by §1.
In making the relevant licensing decisions, NFLP is “an instrumentality” of the
teams. Sealy, 388 U. S., at 352–354. Pp. 11–17.
(e) Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped
by antitrust law. The fact that the NFL teams share an interest in making the
entire league successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate to produce
games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of
collective decisions. Because some of these restraints on competition are
necessary to produce the NFL’s product, the Rule of Reason generally should
apply, and teams’ cooperation is likely to be permissible. And depending upon
the activity in question, the Rule of Reason can at times be applied without
detailed analysis. But the activity at issue in this case is still concerted
activity covered for §1 purposes. Pp. 18–19.
538 F. 3d 736, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court.
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