Ibormeith IP, LLC, the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 6,313,749, appeals a district court’s grant of summary judgment of indefiniteness in favor of defendants Mercedes- Benz USA, LLC, and Daimler AG (collectively, “Mercedes”). We affirm.
Lutz Biedermann and Jurgen Harms (collectively “Biedermann”) appeal a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”), now the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, affirming the rejection of claims 32, 33, 35–37 37, 39, and 48 of U.S. Patent Application No. 10/306,057 (“’057 Application”) for obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Ex parte Biedermann, No. 2010-006113, Application No. 10/306,057, 2012 WL 3561836 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 16, 2012) (Decision on Request for Rehearing) (“Decision on Rehearing”); Ex parte Biedermann, No. 2010-006113, Application No. 10/306,057, 2012 WL 1979400 (B.P.A.I. May 30, 2012) (Decision on Appeal) (“Decision on Appeal”). Because the Board issued new grounds of rejection, this court vacates and remands for further proceedings.
Keurig, Inc. (“Keurig”) appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granting summary judgment that Sturm Foods, Inc. (“Sturm”) does not infringe claim 29 of Keurig’s U.S. Patent 7,165,488 (the “’488 patent”) and claims 6–8 of Keurig’s U.S. Patent 6,606,938 (the “’938 patent”). Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., No. 10-841, 2012 WL 4049799 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 2012). Because the district court did not err in concluding that Keurig’s patent rights were exhausted and hence were not infringed by Sturm, we affirm.
Plaintiff Bose Corporation won summary judgment on its breach of contract and trademark claims against defendant Salman Ejaz. Bose Corp. v. Ejaz, No. 11-10629, 2012 WL 4052861 (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2012). Ejaz admitted to selling home theater systems manufactured by Bose for use in the United States to customers in other countries, selling them across international markets to take advantage of higher retail prices abroad. Bose asserted that Ejaz sold its American products in Australia without Bose's consent even though he had signed a settlement agreement promising not to do so after he had made similar sales in Europe. Ejaz appeals, and we affirm.
After a trial and post-trial motions, the United States District Court for the Central District of California determined that Emulex Corporation (Emulex) infringed Broadcom Corporation’s (Broadcom) U.S. Patent No. 7,058,150 (the ’150 patent). On appeal, the only issues remaining relate to the ’150 patent, and the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction and modifications to that permanent injunction. Second Amended Notice of Appeal, Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., No. 2012-1309 (Fed. Cir. August 10, 2012) (No. 43). Upon review of the record, this court affirms the district court’s finding that Emulex infringed the ’150 patent. Similarly, this court affirms the district court’s determination that the ’150 patent would not have been obvious at the time of invention and hence invalid. Finally, because the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting a permanent injunction with a well-crafted sunset period, this court also affirms that determination.
Intellect Wireless, Inc. (Intellect) appeals from the district court’s judgment that U.S. Patent Nos. 7,266,186 (’186 patent) and 7,310,416 (’416 patent) are unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. We affirm.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Mark Swift, Michael Schaltenbrand, and Joey Siddle entered into an informal partnership arrangement in which they agreed to operate a mailorder pharmacy and to divide any profits they earned among themselves according to agreed‐upon percentages. Over the next four years, the partners used this lack of structure to conceal their efforts to enrich themselves at the expense of their business. When the partners had a fundamental disagreement over the direction of their venture, one partner, Swift, caused two lawsuits to be filed against his other partners, Schaltenbrand and Siddle. The cases were consolidated and over the next two‐and‐a‐half years, lawyers for the partners racked up attorneys’ fees attempting to sort out the precise parameters of the oral agreement among the partners. Ultimately, the district court listened to fourteen days of testimony before ruling against Swift on most of his claims.
Swift and his allies (whom he paid to file suit against his partners) now appeal the trial court’s ruling. They contend that the district court erred in issuing a declaratory judgment invalidating a copyright registration that Swift’s marketing company, DeliverMed Holdings, LLC, obtained for a logo used by the partnership. We must agree with Swift on this issue. We have no problem with the district court’s finding that Swift misrepresented a material fact in DeliverMed’s application to register a copyright in the logo. But the district court erred in invalidating DeliverMed’s copyright registration without first consulting the Register of Copyrights as to the significance of the inaccurate information Swift knowingly provided. Because the Copyright Act requires courts to perform this curious procedure before invalidating a registration because of a fraud on the Copyright Office, we reverse this part of the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
We affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment. We are not persuaded by DeliverMed’s challenge to the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Schaltenbrand and Siddle for their successful defense of DeliverMed’s copyright infringement claim. Infringement defendants are presumptively entitled to such fees and Swift’s deliberate efforts to deceive the Copyright Office serve only to solidify the case for the court’s award. Furthermore, we will not overturn the district court’s finding that Swift failed to prove Schaltenbrand and Siddle breached their obligation to provide him with a share of the partnership’s profits. Although Swift maintains that he was entitled to more than the over $1 million he received in distributions from an unprofitable venture, he has not provided any reliable basis to show a deficiency between what he received and what he was owed. Finally, Swift raises a number of fraud claims on appeal but he waived them by declining to include them in the final pretrial order in this case.
On July 31, 2009, ARRIS Group, Inc. (“ARRIS”)1 filed a motion to hold SeaChange International Inc. (“SeaChange”) in contempt of a permanent injunction order. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that ARRIS failed to meet its burden of showing contempt by clear and convincing evidence and declined to hold SeaChange in contempt. ARRIS appeals. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the contempt motion, we affirm.
TecSec, Inc. appeals from the district court’s entry of judgment that the defendant-appellees (the “defendants”) do not infringe various claims of three TecSec patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,369,702 (the “’702 Patent”); No. 5,680,452 (the “’452 Patent”); and No. 5,898,781 (the “’781 Patent”). Because the district court incorrectly construed the claims, this court affirms-in-part, reverses-in-part, and remands for further proceedings.
Microsoft Corporation appeals from an order of the United States International Trade Commission that found no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 insofar as Microsoft alleged that Motorola Mobility, Inc. (Motorola), infringed four of Microsoft’s patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,578,054; 6,826,762; 7,644,376; and 5,664,133. The Commission found no infringement of those patents. As to three of the patents, the ’054, ’762, and ’376 patents, the Commission also found no violation on an additional ground, namely, that Microsoft had not proved that there was a domestic industry relating to articles protected by the patents.
We affirm the Commission on three of the patents but reverse in part on the fourth. We affirm the finding that Motorola does not infringe the ’054 patent, as well as the finding that Microsoft failed to prove that a domesticindustry exists for products protected by the ’762 and ’376 patents. As to the claims of the ’133 patent that are at issue, however, we hold that the Commission relied on incorrect claim constructions in finding no infringement, the only basis for its finding no violation, for the main group of accused products, while we affirm the noninfringement finding for the accused alternative design. We therefore partly reverse the Commission’s final determination as to the ’133 patent and remand for further proceedings.