After reviewing the record, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Hotel Meliá and Gran Meliá marks cannot co-exist in Puerto Rico without creating an impermissible likelihood of confusion among reasonable consumers. The district court's decision to grant summary judgment in Dorpan's favor was erroneous. Thus, we vacate the district court's entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AE Tech Co., Ltd. (“AE Tech”), S&F Corporation, and GreatShield, Inc.1 appeal the district court’s preliminary injunction granted in favor of Aevoe Corporation (“Aevoe”) barring particular products from the market. The district court originally granted the injunction in January 2012. AE Tech did not appeal from that order. In May 2012, the district court concluded that the Appellants had violated the injunction with an alleged redesign. At that time, the court altered certain language in the injunction. Appellants now argue that the court modified the injunction in May 2012 and that their appeal from that modification is timely. Because the district court merely clarified the scope of the original injunction in its May 2012 order, we find there was no modification that substantially changed the legal relationship between the parties. Based on this finding, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
SkinMedica, Inc. (“SkinMedica”) appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California granting Histogen, Inc., Histogen Aesthetics, and Gail Naughton (collectively “Histogen”) summary judgment of noninfringement of the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,372,494 (’494 patent) and 7,118,746 (’746 patent) after construing a phrase common to both patents. Because we find no legal error in the district court’s construction, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
In these consolidated appeals, Apple Inc. and Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively “Samsung”) challenge orders of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denying requests to seal various confidential exhibits attached to pre-trial and post-trial motions. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 3283478 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (“August Order”); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 5988570 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2012) (“November Order”) (collectively “Unsealing Orders”). Because the district court abused its discretion in refusing to seal the confidential information at issue in the appeals, we reverse and remand.
Julia Copeland Cooper (Copeland) appeals from a grant of summary judgment dismissing on statute of limitations grounds her Copyright Act claims against NCS Pearson, Inc. for co-ownership of a psychological test. The statute of limitations for claims under the Copyright Act is three years. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). Because any such claims available to Ms. Copeland would have accrued in 1993 or 1996 and she did not bring this action until 2010, we affirm.
Appeal from a September 21, 2012, judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Amon, C.J.), which dismissed this copyright case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We hold that where the holder of a copyright in a litigation document has authorized a party to the litigation to use the document in the litigation, this constitutes an irrevocable authorization to all parties to the litigation (and to their attorneys, as well as the court) to use the documents thereafter in the litigation throughout its duration. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the district court’s dismissal of the action is AFFIRMED.
The University of Utah (“UUtah”) brought this lawsuit to correct inventorship of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,056,704 and 7,078,196 (the “Tuschl Patents”). Originally, UUtah named as defendants the assignees (“Assignees”) of the Tuschl Patents: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften e.V., Max-Planck-Innovation GmbH, Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (collectively, the “non-State Defendants”) and the University of Massachusetts (“UMass”). UMass argued that, because the dispute was between two States, the Supreme Court had exclusive original jurisdiction. In response, UUtah amended its complaint, substituting four UMass officials (the “Named Officials”) in place of UMass. The Named Officials then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that UUtah’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity and that UUtah had failed to join UMass, which they claimed was an indispensable party. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. This case requires us to examine the issues of sovereign immunity and federal jurisdiction that arise when state universities are involved on both sides of an inventorship dispute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Plaintiff-Appellee filed a copyright infringement complaint against Defendant-Appellant, which it later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff-Appellee subsequently filed a motion to vacate its voluntary dismissal under Rule 60(b), which the district court granted. Because we find that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case, we AFFIRM.
The parties to this trademark dispute make consumer products for rinsing sinus cavities. Med-Systems, Inc., the earlier entrant in this market, sells its products under the federally registered trademark SinuCleanse and two similar marks. Water Pik, Inc., which traditionally sold oral irrigators and showerheads, registered the trademark SINUSENSE with the intention of selling sinus-irrigation devices under the brand name “SinuSense.” It brought an action against Med-Systems in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, seeking a declaratory judgment that its use of the SinuSense brand name did not infringe on any of Med-Systems’ marks. Med-Systems counterclaimed for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127. Ruling that the SinuSense brand was not likely to cause consumer confusion, the district court awarded summary judgment to Water Pik on the counterclaims and dismissed Water Pik’s declaratory-judgment claim as moot. We affirm.
Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. (“Hamilton Beach”) appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granting in part Sunbeam Products, Inc.’s (“Sunbeam”) motion for summary judgment finding claims 1 and 3–7 (“asserted claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,947,928 (“the ’928 patent”) invalid as anticipated. The district court also found that Sunbeam did not literally infringe the asserted claims of the ’928 patent. Hamilton Beach’s appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). For the reasons below, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the asserted claims are invalid under the on-sale bar.