Grant of summary judgment to defendants on a claim for copyright infringement, on the ground that the claim was time-barred, is affirmed, as a time-barred ownership claim will bar a claim for copyright infringement where, as here, the infringement claim cannot be decided without adjudication of a genuine dispute as to the plaintiff's ownership of the copyright.
In an action for infringement of patents related to an improved electrical connector that snaps into electrical junction boxes with one hand instead of two, district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, non-willfulness, and no damages as to the patents-in-suit, is vacated and remanded as, the district court's in parties' second case misconstrued the "spring metal adapter" and "spring steel adapter" terms by importing a "split" limitation from the specifications into the claims.
In an action for infringement of a patent related to a system for collecting, processing, and delivering information from a service provider, such as a telephone company, to a customer, district court's grant of summary judgment that defendants do not infringe the claims of the '270 patent is vacated in part, reversed in part and remanded where: 1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment of noninfringement as the district court erred by holding that in order to "use" a system under section 271(a), a party must exercise physical or direct control over each individual element of the system; and 2) the district court erred by holding there was no genuine issue of material fact that a prior art meets the "summary reports as specified by the user" limitation as there is a factual dispute as to whether the records that the prior art provided are "summary reports" as construed by the district court.
In plaintiff's suit for infringement of certain copyrighted software used to process insurance claims, district court's dismissal of the suit in concluding that plaintiff held only a non-exclusive license and thus lacked statutory standing to sue and a grant of attorneys' fees and costs to defendants is affirmed as, defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as plaintiff did not have the kind of interest in the software that it needed in order to be entitled to bring this suit for copyright infringement, and as such, as prevailing parties, defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees under section 505 of the Copyright Act.
In a patent owner's malpractice action against a law firm, arising from an underlying patent infringement litigation involving patents directed to lacrosse sticks and heads, district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction is vacated and remanded as, because at least one of plaintiff's malpractice claims requires the court to resolve a substantive issue of patent law, 28 U.S.C. section 1338, which grants district courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under a statute relating to patents, invests the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims in this case.
In a patent infringement suit against Google, Inc., brought by an Internet company, involving a patent directed to a method for adding a user selectable function to a hyperlink, district court's order finding this case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. section 285 and awarding attorneys' fees and costs and expenses to Google, is reversed and remanded where: 1) although plaintiff was ultimately unsuccessful in its patent infringement suit, Google has not met its high burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that this suit was brought frivolously or that plaintiff's position on claim construction was objectively baseless; and 2) because there is no basis for finding of bad faith, the award of expert fees is set aside.
In an architect's suit against former clients and an architectural firm for violation of the Lanham Act and breach of contract and a claim that defendants had violated its copyright in a home design, judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded where: 1) district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff's copyright claim on the ground that it did not own the copyright to the architectural plans at the time those rights were allegedly infringed, and that is thus lacks standing to assert a copyright infringement action, is affirmed as although, at least where there is no dispute between transferor and transferee, a third party infringer cannot evade liability by invoking section 204(a) and demanding a contemporaneously-drafted instrument, none of the proffered evidence permits a jury to conclude that an oral transfer of the copyright design from plaintiff's former firm took place on Ocober 5, 1999; 2) district court's dismissal of defendants' tortious-interference counterclaim is vacated as defendants' allegation that plaintiff's delay in permitting and the consequent delay in construction fulfills the elements of section 766A; and 3) the district court's sua sponte dismissal of defendants' breach of contract and of fiduciary duty counterclaims is vacated and remanded as all defendants can use these claims as anchor claims to which they may attach their resurrected tortious-interference-with-contract statute.
The final decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) holding claim 5 of a patent, related to a coating apparatus known as a Wurster coater used to coat particles, such as pharmaceutical ingredients, unpatentable for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. section 103(a), is reversed as, because substantial evidence does not support the Board's finding that a prior art expressly or implicitly teaches using an air wall to shield particles from entering the initial spray pattern, the Board has not made a proper prima facie case of obviousness.
In plaintiff's suit for infringement of the '216 patent against Microsoft, directed to a software registration system to deter copying of software, judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded where: 1) district court's grant of JMOL of non-infringement is reversed as the jury's verdict on infringement was supported by substantial evidence; 2) district court's alternative grant of a new trial on infringement is reversed as an abuse of discretion; 3) district court's grant of JMOL of no willfulness is affirmed because the jury's verdict on willfulness was not supported by substantial evidence, and as such, the district court's alternative grant of a new trial for willfulness is rendered moot; 4) new trial on damages is granted because the jury's damages award was fundamentally tainted by the use of a legally inadequate methodology; and 5) district court's denial of Microsoft's motion for JMOL of invalidity is affirmed as the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jury verdict of no invalidity of the '216 patent was supported by substantial evidence.
In an action for copyright infringement in violation of section 501 of the Copyright Act, which entitled copyright owners to institute an action for infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work (specially produced phonorecords), summary judgment for defendants is affirmed where the mailing at issue effected a sale of the promotional music discs to the recipients for purposes of the first sale doctrine.