This is an action brought by Blueport Co. (“Blueport”) against the United States for copyright infringement and violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. The Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) dismissed Blueport’s claims for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Government has not waived sovereign immunity for any of Blueport’s claims. Because the CFC’s decision contains no reversible legal error, we affirm.
Plaintiff-Appellant the Board of Regents of the University of Texas System (“Board of Regents”) appeals a final judgment by the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., No. 1:05-CV-181 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2007). The district court entered final judgment after the parties stipulated that Defendants-Appellees BENQ America, Corp., et al. (collectively “BENQ”) did not infringe U.S. Patent No. 4,674,112 (“’112 Patent”), owned by the Board of Regents. The parties stipulated to judgment based on the district court’s construction of the claim term “syllabic element” and its subsequent decision to grant summary judgment of non-infringement to Defendant-Appellee Motorola Corp. (“Motorola”) based, in part, on that construction. The Board of Regents appeals both the district court’s claim construction and its grant of summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found in favor of plaintiffs Eisai Co., Ltd. and Eisai, Inc. (collectively Eisai) with respect to the validity and enforceability of U.S. Patent No. 5,045,552 (’552 patent). Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 9223 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (SJ Validity Order); Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 9053 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (SJ Enforceability Order). After a bench trial, the district court found that Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd. and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Inc. (collectively Dr. Reddy’s) and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Teva) had failed to prove the remaining allegations of inequitable conduct, and that Eisai had established that Dr. Reddy’s and Teva infringed Eisai’s ’552 patent. Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs, Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 9053 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006) (Trial Order). Because the district court correctly determined that the ’552 patent is non-obvious over the proffered prior art and that Eisai’s alleged acts during prosecution did not rise to the level of inequitable conduct, this court affirms.
The plaintiff-appellants in these four antitrust class actions are wholesale purchasers of Tiazac (extended-release Diltiazem Hydrochloride, hereinafter Diltiazem HCl), a controlled-release drug for hypertension and angina. They alleged that Biovail Corporation, which manufactures Tiazac, misused a patent to keep off the market a generic equivalent manufactured by Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. The district court entered summary judgment for Biovail, which we affirm.
This is a patent infringement case under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Apotex, Inc. and Apotex Corp. (collectively “Apotex”) appeal the grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that the patent held by Roche Palo Alto LLC and Allergan, Inc. (collectively “Roche”) is valid and infringed by the formulation covered by Apotex’s abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”). Roche Palo Alto, LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Because we find no error in the court’s holding that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is inapplicable and that claim preclusion prohibits Apotex from raising other validity challenges, we affirm.
The issue before us is whether the nationwide, permanent injunction mandated by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. II, 102 Stat. 3949 (“SHVA”), prohibits Appellee EchoStar Communications Corporation (“EchoStar”) from leasing its transponder to National Programming Service, LLC (“NPS”), thereby allowing NPS to retransmit distant network programming to eligible subscribers. See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(7)(B)(i). We agree with the district court that EchoStar is not in violation of § 119(a)(7)(B)(i). We affirm.
In this case, two companies with similar names find themselves in the midst of a trademark dispute. Over the course of several years, Sure Foot Corp. has repeatedly accused Surefoot LC, of infringing on its trademark, occasionally threatened litigation if Surefoot LC failed to change its name, and filed five administrative petitions opposing Surefoot LC’s attempts to obtain trademark registrations. Faced with uncertainty about its right to use the “Surefoot” mark, Surefoot LC filed a declaratory judgment suit against Sure Foot Corp., asking the district court to determine once and for all whether it was infringing on Sure Foot Corp.’s rights. Applying our then-governing precedent, the district court dismissed the suit for failing to present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III because it found Surefoot LC had no reasonable apprehension of an imminent lawsuit from Sure Foot Corp. After the district court issued its judgment, however, the Supreme Court, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007), expressly rejected the “reasonable apprehension of imminent suit” test on the ground that it imposed an additional hurdle inconsistent with the Court’s Article III jurisprudence. This appeal calls upon us to assess and apply MedImmune’s teachings for the first time. In doing so, we conclude that a
triable case or controversy within the meaning of Article III exists; accordingly, we are obliged to reverse and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings.
Winifred Knight Mewborn (“Mewborn”), daughter of Eric Knight, the author of the world-famous children’s story and novel, Lassie Come Home (collectively, the “Lassie Works”), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Classic Media, Inc. (“Classic”) and denial of Mewborn’s partial summary judgment motion. Each party sought declaratory relief as to their respective copyright interests in the Lassie Works, works that were in their renewal copyright terms on January 1, 1978 when the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act” or the “1976 Act”) took effect. This appeal requires us to determine whether the Act’s termination of transfer right, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), can be extinguished by a
post-1978 re-grant of the very rights previously assigned before 1978. Because we conclude that such a result would circumvent the plain statutory language of the 1976 Act, as well as the congressional intent to give the benefit of the additional renewal term to the author and his heirs, we hold that the post-1978 assignment did not extinguish Mewborn’s statutory termination rights.