Plaintiff-Appellant, Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. (Golden Bridge) appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granting summary judgment that claims 13 and 23 of U.S. Patent No. 6,574,267 (’267 patent), which is assigned to Golden Bridge, are anticipated by PCT Publication No. WO9746041 to Häkkinen et al. (Häkkinen) and a May 1995 version of a Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) standard called “Mobile Station-Base Station Compatibility Standard for Dual-Mode Wideband Spread Spectrum Cellular System,” TIA/EIA/IS-95A (IS-95A). We affirm the judgment of the district court that claims 13 and 23 are anticipated by the Häkkinen reference. Because we affirm the district court judgment of invalidity on the basis of the Häkkinen reference, we do not address the invalidation based upon the IS-95A reference.
Debate on reform plan before Congress has big implications for state inventors
Posted: May 26, 2008
Washington - Wisconsin inventors have been filing patents on new methods for brewing beer, making cheese and even constructing sleighs since the 1800s.
Today, the majority of patent applications are for computer gizmos, software and biotechnology. The nation's patent laws, however, have not kept up with the fast-paced global economy, technology gurus said.
High-tech companies particularly are pushing Congress to revise the patent laws, saying they are no longer suitable to deal with modern developments such as laptop computers, which change constantly and involve hundreds of patents at a time. They have argued that costly patent litigation and exorbitant damage awards have hindered the development of new ideas.
Pharmaceutical companies and even some high-tech companies such as General Electric are pushing back - countering that some of the changes their opponents want could reduce protections for patent-holders by limiting the damages innovators could seek from copycats.
The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, which patents the discoveries of University of Wisconsin-Madison researchers, has some of those same concerns.
Lobbyists for the drug companies want broad protections and short time frames for patent challenges, whereas those for the computer companies want to reduce damages for patented inventions that make up only a small portion of a product.
This infringement case returns to us for the second time after remand to the district court on the issue of whether Aventis committed inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). In our earlier opinion, we held that the dosage of the prior art composition used in half-life comparisons with the patented composition was information material to patentability, but we remanded to the district court to determine whether there was an intent to deceive by Aventis in failing to disclose the dosage. After a trial on the matter, the district court found that there was intent to deceive and held the patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct. Because we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in its holding of inequitable conduct, we affirm.
Mangosoft, Inc. and Mangosoft Corporation (collectively, “Mangosoft”) appeal from a final judgment of the district court following a summary judgment order holding that Oracle Corporation (“Oracle”) did not infringe Mangosoft’s U.S. Patent No. 6,148,377 (“the ’377 patent”). Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 02-CV-545 (D.N.H. Mar. 14, 2006) (“Summary Judgment Opinion”). Because Mangosoft’s arguments on appeal relate solely to claim construction, and because we find no error in the district court’s construction of the sole claim term raised on appeal, we affirm.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (“DuPont”) appeals from the district court’s denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. Memorandum Opinion, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company v. MacDermid, Inc., Case No. 06-CV-3383 (MLC/TJB) (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2007) (“Preliminary Injunction Opinion”). We heard oral argument on April 9, 2008. We hold that the district court abused its discretion in finding that a substantial question as to validity existed because of uncertainty regarding the priority date. Because the district court did not reach the parties’ remaining arguments as to validity and enforceability as well as the remaining preliminary injunction factors, we vacate and remand for the district court to consider these issues in light of the correct priority date.
The issue in this case is whether a claim for patent infringement should have been brought in a prior case between the parties and is now precluded by the prior judgment. Plaintiff-Appellant Acumed LLC (“Acumed”) appeals a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissing its action against Defendants-Appellants Stryker Corp., et al., (“Stryker”) as barred by claim preclusion. Specifically, the district court held that Acumed’s present infringement suit against Stryker was precluded by a prior infringement suit between the parties which was resolved by a final judgment on the merits, namely Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-CV-513 (D. Or. April 21, 2006) (“Acumed I”). Because the district court misconstrued this court’s precedent regarding the manner in which claim preclusion applies to successive claims for patent infringement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff, Paul Oravec, brought this action under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., against several parties associated with the Trump Palace and the Trump Royale (collectively, “Trump Buildings”), twin high-rise condominiums in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida. Oravec alleged that these defendants infringed his copyrighted architectural designs through the design, development, and construction of the Trump Buildings. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and denied Oravec’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. After thorough review of the record, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment was proper and that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of leave to amend. Accordingly, we affirm.
Appellants Othentec Limited, Othentec Ltd., and EC4 Technologies Limited appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellees Jeffrey Phelan, Mark Martens, and EC4 Technologies, Incorporated. Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that they had established issues of material fact on their claims under the Virginia Computer Crimes Act and the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. We find no error in the ruling of the district court, and uphold its entry of summary judgment.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Haight, J.), entered November 8, 2006, dismissing claims for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.
Reversed and remanded.
After selling 100 "bootleg" DVDs of unreleased movies to an undercover federal agent on June 11, 2003, and then selling 200 more to the same agent on January 13, 2004, David Armstead was indicted and convicted on two felony counts of willful copyright infringement for private financial gain by distributing at least 10 unauthorized DVDs on each occasion, having "a total retail value of more than $2,500," in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1). At trial, Armstead contested only the total retail value of the DVDs sold and urged that he be convicted of only misdemeanors for selling DVDs with a total retail value of $2,500 or less. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(3). The jury, however, convicted Armstead of the felony charges, and he was sentenced to six months’ home detention.
On appeal, Armstead focuses on the fact that he sold the DVDs in the first transaction for a total of $500 and in the second transaction for a total of $1,000, and that the government offered no adequate alternative value to prove that the "total retail value" of the DVDs sold in each transaction was more than $2,500, as required for felony convictions. He requests that we vacate the felony convictions and enter judgments for misdemeanor offenses, remanding the case for resentencing accordingly.
As a matter of first impression, we hold that "retail value" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) refers to the value of copies of the copyrighted material at the time the defendant committed the violation and sold the copies and that the retail value is determined by taking the highest of the "face value," "par value," or "market value" of copies of the copyrighted material in a retail context. See 18 U.S.C. § 2311. Because the evidence of retail value, so construed, supported felony convictions, we affirm.